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Abstract—The quest for a cryptographically secure pseudorandom bit generator (PRBG) was initiated long ago [13] [14], and for a
long time the proposed pseudorandom generators were very slow [?]. (INSERIRLO IN BIBLIOGRAFIA). More recently some ”provably
secure” PRBG capable to achieve a throughput rate greater than 1Mbit/sec has been proposed in [1] [2]. We noticed, anyway, the
absence of Java implementations of such PRBGs, provably due to poor expected values for throughput rate.
In the present paer we show that it is quite easy to write down Java implementations for them, achieving a throughput rae into range
0, 5 ÷ 7 Mbit/sec on very common mobile low-end devices. If moreover a modification we proposed in [3] is applied, the throughput
rate is in the range 5÷ 80 Mbit/sec and can be clearly sufficient for many applications.
Index Terms—CSPRBG, provable security.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
THE main purpose of this paper is to show that itis easy to realize a software implementation in Java
of a CSPRBG (cryptographically secure pseudo random
bit generator, see definition 2.1) and to give a quite
precise estimate of the throughput rate achieved. Since
many CSPRBGs are based on the iteration of a one way
function we developed some Java code to test the speed
of the computation of this function for two well known
PRBGs in the literature, namely RSAPRG [1] and QUAD
[2],[4]. In the process of optimization of our code we
obtained a clear evidence about the following assertions:
• currently used algorithms for modular reduction
with respect to a fixed modulus (i.e. the computation
of the remainder of a division) can be improved up
to 20% by simple algebraic methods (when the bit
length n of the modulus is n ≥ 6000);
• tha Java BigInteger class has a completely different
behaviour under MAC or Windows o.s. with respect
to Android o.s. . This almost surely corresponds to
a different Java code in the two cases;
• these Java implementations, without any use of par-
allel computations achieve a throughput rate in the
range 0,5÷7 Mbit/sec for PRBG that are ”provably
secure” on very common low-end devices (PCs,
tablets or smartphones).
In cryptographic applications, given that Alice and
Bob share a private key, the production of a bits stream
by a PRBG based on this key is completely equivalent
to an encryption/decryption communication algorithm.
• A. Corbo Esposito and F. Didone are with the Universita´ degli studi di
Cassino e del Lazio Meridionale, Italia.
They are equivalent in the sense that the communica-
tion algorithm can achieve the same throughput rate of
the PRBG and that is as secure as PRBG is. Moreover
the communication algorithm has zero latency, i.e. the
encryption/decryption time is negligible (see paper [3]).
The security of a PRBG is however very often established
in an empirical way and very rarely we deal with a
”provable security”. So we face three main questions:
1) what is ”provable security”?
2) there exist PRBGs that are provably secure?
3) how efficient they can be?
As for the answer to questions 1) and 2) we have
found, in literature, two PRBGs that qualify themselves
as ”provably secure”:
• RSAPRG described in the paper [1];
• QUAD described in papers [2] and [4].
In both cases the provable security consists in some
reduction theorem of this type: if the sequence produced
is distinguishable (according to some parameters) from a
real random sequence, then some well known problem
could be solved in less then a certain amount of time
(depending on the parameters) and this will be less of the
time used by the best known algorithm for this problem.
About the efficiency of these PRBGs, the throughput
rates they claim (see section 5 of [1], section 4.5 of [4]
and paper [10]) well fit our results and in some cases
we outperform their claims.
In paper [3], however, we show how it is possi-
ble to modify a CSPRBG so that we can increase the
throughput rate up to more than 10×, while retaining the
essential features of provable security. When we apply
this modification to RSAPRG and QUAD we obtain a
throughput rate in the range 5÷80 Mbit/sec on the same
devices considered before. It seems to us that to achieve
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2a throughput in such range for a PRBG based on a
”provable secure” basic iteration (moreover in a software
implementation not using any parallel computation) is a
promising result.
2 CSPRBGS AND ”PROVABLE SECURITY”
2.1 Some notations
In the paper in general it will be clear when some letter
is used to denote an integer variable, real variable or
some other variable type. Moreover we will denote by:
• M(n) the (minimum) time to multiply two n-bits
integers;
• M(m,n) the time to multiply an m-bits integer by
an n-bits integer;
• SQ(n) the time to compute the square of an n-bits
integer;
• mod(N) the remainder of a division by N ;
• MR(m,n) the time to compute the modular reduc-
tion of an m-bits integer modulo an n-bits integer;
• bxc the floor function, x ∈ R.
Many CSPRBGs have a similar structure. We call them
”typical” in the sense of the following definition.
Definition 2.1: A typical CSPRBG (TCSPRBG for short)
is given by:
1) a (private) seed x0 ∈ X (some numeric space).
2) (public) data:
• a one way (usually invertible) function f : X →
X ;
• a one way function g : X → S where S is the
set of strings of bits.
The basic iteration of the TCSPRBG is the computation:
xh+1 = f(xh), h ∈ N
yh+1 = g(xh), h ∈ N
The output of TCSPRBG is the string S = y1||y2||... where
|| denotes the concatenation.
2.2 RSAPRG
The RSAPRG has been proposed by Steinfeld, Pieprzyk
and Wang in [1] and is a Micali-Schnorr type PRBG.
Given a RSA modulus N of bitlength n (i.e. N = p · q
where p and q are two prime numbers of bitlength n2 )
and an exponent e such that GCD(e, (p− 1)(q− 1)) = 1,
the one way function f is given by f(x) = xemod(N)
while the function g is given by g(x) = f(x)mod(2r) plus
the conversion to a bit string, so that at each iteration the
r least significant bits of xh+1 are outputted. The seed
x0 ∈ ZN . The maximum number of bits outputted will
be fixed to l. They call such PRBG a (n, e, r, l)-RSAPRG.
The security result for RSAPRG is given by corollary
4.1 of [1]) that we report here (see [1] for related defini-
tions and details).
Theorem 2.1: For all n ≥ 29, any (T, δ) distinguisher D for
(n, e, r, l)-RSAPRG can be converted into a (TINV , INV )
inversion algorithm A for the (n, e, r, w)-CopRSA problem
(with w = 3 log(2l/δ)+5) with TINV = 64 · (l/δ)2n log(n) ·
(T +O(l/r log(e)n2)) and INV = δ/9− 4/2n/2.
Loosely speaking the (n, e, r, w)-CopRSA problem is the
following one: we are given xemod(N), n/2 + w most
significant bits of x, r last significant bits of x and
we are requested to find x. In section 5 of [1] it is
concretely estimated the minimum time needed to solve
(n, e, r, w)-CopRSA problem. This is done regarding it
as a particular SSRSA (small solution RSA) problem and
assuming that the best way to solve it will be either to
factorize N or to run a celebrated Coppersmith attack
[8]. In the table 1 of [1] authors give some concrete
values. For example taking e = 9 and n = 6144, at each
multiplication 2196 bits can be sent to output. In this
case the RSAPRG can be proved to be safe if moreover
the total number of bits outputted is less than 232(∼ 500
Mbytes).
2.3 QUAD
This PRBG has been proposed by Berbain, Gilbert and
Patarin in [2]. In this case the seed x0 = (x0,1, ..., x0,n) ∈
{0, 1}n = (Z2)n. The (public) data are given by kn
multivariate quadratic polynomials P1(x), ..., Pkn(x) in
GF(2) (i.e. x = (x1, .., xn) ∈ (Z2)n and the coefficients of
polynomials are in Z2). The basic iteration is given by:
xh+1 = (xh+1,1, ..., xh+1,n) = (P1(xh), ..., Pn(xh))
while:
yh+1 = (yh+1,1, ..., yh+1,(k−1)n) = (Pn+1(xh), ..., Pkn(xh))
is converted to a string and sent to output. The security
result for QUAD is stated in theorem 4 of [2] that we
report here:
Theorem 2.2: Let L = λ(k − 1)n the number of keystream
bits produced by in time λTS using λ iterations of QUAD
construction. Suppose there exists an algorithm A that dis-
tinguishes the L-bit keystream sequence associated with a
known randomly chosen system S and an unknown randomly
chosen initial internal state x ∈ {0, 1}n from a random L-
bit sequence in time T with advantage . Then there exists
an algorithm C, which given the image S(x) of a randomly
chosen (unknown) n-bit value x a randomly chosen n-bit to
m-bit quadratic system S produces a preimage of S(x) with
probability at least ′ = 23λ over all possible values of x and
S in time upper bounded by T ′.
T ′ =
27n2λ2
2
(
T+(λ+2)TS+log
(
27nλ2
2
)
+2
)
+
27nλ2
2
TS
The security result is linked to hardness of MQ prob-
lem, i.e. to find a solution to a random choosen mul-
tivariate quadratic system. This problem is proved to
be NP hard, even for the case of quadratic polynomials
over the field GF(2). Furthermore, in contrast to number
theoretic problems like integer factorization and discrete
logarithms, it is believed to resist quantum computer
attacks [11]. In paper [2] authors refer to an estimate of
Magali Bardet [9] for the best time to solve a generic MQ
3problem of kn equation in n unknowns using Groebner
basis, given by:
T (k, n) '
((
n+ 1
D
))2,37
where:
D
n
= −k + 1
2
+
1
2
√
2k2 − 10k − 1 + 2(k + 2)
√
k(k + 2)
For a better understanding we easily obtained the fol-
lowing expansion for D for larger values of k:
D
n
∼ 1
8k
− 1
16k2
+
7
128k3
+ o
(
1
k3
)
To obtain a contradiction time T ′ has to be smaller
than T (k, n) by a factor 1′ , assuming k = 2, if one
wants output a maximum of 240 bits a contraddiction
is obtained if n ≥ 350. The authors, however, judging
their proofs not optimal, suggest to take for practical
applications k = 2, n = 160, L ≤ 240.
3 HOW TO IMPLEMENT THE BASIC ITERATION
3.1 Implementation of the basic iteration of
RSAPRG
In this case the basic iteration is given by the com-
putation of xemod(N), where x and N have the same
bitlength n and e is a low exponent. Following [1] pag
9 we assume n = 6144 and e = 9 we can compute
x9mod(N) as follows:
y ← x
for j = 1 to 3
{x← x2
x← xmod(N)}
x← yx
x← xmod(N)
The computation requires 3 squares SQ(n), 1 multi-
plication M(n) and 4 modular reductions MR(2n, n)1.
In the cryptographic range (103 ≤ n ≤ 105) the most
efficient way to perform M(n) is given by a subquadratic
algorithm (i.e Karatsuba [6] or Toom Cook [7]). For
reference about these methods we refer to [?]. In our case
n = 6144 and we can assume that Karatsuba or Toom
Cook are roughly equivalent (the actual behaviour can
be different depending on both software and hardware).
Since for Karatsuba algorithm:
M(n) ' 3M
(
n
2
)
(1)
while for Toom Cook 3:
M(n) ' 5M
(
n
3
)
(2)
1. An alternative procedure could be exploited by using an algorithm
[15] that directly computes x3 without computing x2. For our purposes
(calculation of x9) this procedure anyway should turn out to be
(slightly) slower.
this amounts to assume:
M(n) ' 3M
(
n
2
)
' 5M
(
n
3
)
(3)
in our application range.
Moreover SQ(n) can be roughly estimated by:
SQ(n) ' 2
3
M(n) (4)
(see subsection 1.3.6 of [5]).
As for modular reduction in our case we have to com-
pute (only) the remainder of a division of an integer of
bit length 2n division by the fixed modulus N of bit
length n.
Several algorithms are known to perform this compu-
tation, the most famous being the Barrett algorithm and
the Montgomery algorithm. In Barrett algorithm the fol-
lowing computations are performed to yield x mod(N):
Qˆ←
⌊b x2n c⌊ 22nN ⌋
2n
⌋
x← x− QˆN
while x ≥ N
{x← x−N}
(if Q =
⌊
x
N
⌋
it can be proved that Q − 2 ≤ Qˆ ≤ Q,
so the last cycle is executed at most two times). These
computations require 2M(n) time (ignoring shifts and
subtractions and the precalculus
⌊
22n
N
⌋
). Therefore the
Barrett algorithm reduces MR(2n, n) to 2M(n). A further
observation is that in the multiplication
⌊
x
2n
⌋ ⌊
22n
N
⌋
only
∼ n upper bits have to be computed while in the multi-
plication QˆN only ∼ n lower bits have to be computed.
This observation however, is useful if multiplications
are done using schoolbook algorithm (in this case both
moltiplications time can be halved) while is practically
useless if the multiplications are done with Karatsuba or
Toom Cook2. If we use these algorithms we can however
speed up modular reduction in another way:
• we can use some additional precalculus in order to
reduce a modular reduction from 2n to n bits to
another (shorter) one from m to n bits (n < m < 2n);
• then the generic modular reduction x mod(N) where
the bitlength of x is m and the bitlength of N is n can
be performed by a ”modified” Barrett algorithm:
Qˆ←
⌊b x2n c⌊ 2m+nN ⌋
2m
⌋
x← x− QˆN
while x ≥ N
{x← x−N}
This algorithm requires M(m) +M(m,n) time.
2. The possibility to use subquadratic algorithm for multiplications
is one of the main attractive features of Barrett algorithm. This cannot
be done in Montgomery algorithm where a sequence of additions is
instead performed. For not very large values of n (i.e. n = 1024) it
is still convenient perform multiplications via the schoolbook method
and Montgomery algorithm turns to be about 20% faster than Barrett
one.
4We now, following such observations, give the detailed
description of two different methods to efficiently per-
form a modular reduction from 2n to n bits.
3.2 First method to compute the modular reduction
The idea is to divide the number x, that has bit-length
2n bits, as follows:
x = x12
3
2n + x22
n + x3
with x1, x2 ∼ n2 bits and x3 ∼ n bits. Then:
xmod(N) ≡
(
x1
(
2
3
2nmod(N)
)
+ x22
n + x3
)
mod(N)
It is possible to pre-compute 2
3
2nmod(N).
We observe that x12
3
2nmod(N) costs M(n2 , n) ' 2M(n2 )
(neglecting the pre-computation time). Then the cost of
MR( 32n, n) is M(
n
2 ) +M(
n
2 , n) ' 3M(n2 ).
Therefore the total cost of MR(2n, n) is 5M(n2 ).
This method is more efficient than Barrett algorithm
which requires 2M(n) ' 6M(n2 ), see (3), with a maxi-
mum theoretical gain of 16 ' 16, 7%.
3.3 Method to compute a scalar product
If we have to compute a scalar product with big integers,
(a, b) and (c, d):
(a, b) · (c, d) = ac+ bd
we have to compute two multiplications. Assuming to
know ab and cd, we observe that:
(a− d) · (b− c) = ab− ac− bd+ cd
⇒ ac+ bd = (d− a)(c− b) + ab+ cd
so that the scalar product can be computed with only
one multiplication (we assume that the computational
cost of addition and subtraction is negligible respect the
cost of multiplication).
3.4 Second method to compute the modular reduc-
tion
In this section we illustrate a method that reduces
MR(2n, n) to 8M(n3 ). Let x be an integer of bit-length
2n, then:
x = x12
5
3n + x22
4
3n + x3
with x1, x2 ∼ n3 bits and x3 ∼ 43n bits. Therefore:
xmod(N) =
=
(
x1
(
2
5
3nmod(N)
)
+ x2
(
2
4
3nmod(N)
)
+ x3
)
mod(N)
= (x1R1 + x2R2 + x3)mod(N) = Cmod(N)
where R1 and R2 have bitlength n and can be pre-
computed. If we set:
R1 = R
H
1 2
2
3n +RI12
n
3 +RL1
R2 = R
H
2 2
2
3n +RI22
n
3 +RL2
the amount x1R1+x2R2 can be computed via three scalar
products:
(x1 −RM1 )(RM2 − x2) = x1RM1 + x2RM2 − x1x2 −RM1 RM2
where M = H, I, L. Since RM1 RM2 can be pre-computed
then it possible to compute C in 4M(n3 ). Now we use
Barrett algorithm to compute last modular reduction
which requires 1M(n3 , n) ' 3M(n3 ) and 1M(n3 ). Then the
total cost is 8M(n3 ) that is less than 2M(n) ' 10M
(
n
3
)
by (3), with a maximum theoretical gain of 20%.
3.5 Implementation of the basic iteration of QUAD
To compute the value of a quadratic polynomial in n
indeterminates in GF(2) we have:3
P (x) =
∑
1≤i<j≤n
ai,jxixj +
∑
1≤i≤n
bixi + c
We observe that the addition and xor give the same
result in Z2. The computation of the iteration f consists
in the computation of 2n (we fixed k = 2) quadratic
polynomial values at point x and can be efficiently
realized in Z2 by xoring the columns of the coefficients
of 2n polynomials P1(x), ..., P2n(x); more precisely we
have to xor the columns of coefficients bhi , 1 ≤ h ≤ 2n,
for which xi = 1, ahi,j for which xixj = 1. Such columns
can be arranged in words of d bits (d = 32 or 64 bits
depending on the o.s.). The average number of xor for
each iteration for a MQ system and each bit outputted
is:
n+ 12
(
n
2
)
d
A faster implementation of QUAD is possible if one
makes some precomputations. To give an idea of how
this is possible imagine that n = 2lm, that is the n
indeterminates can be arranged in m blocks of 2l inde-
terminates each. As the index i varies in the same block
of 2l indeterminates all values xi and xixj (i, j belonging
to the same block) are determined, therefore one can
precompute the xor of the columns according to these
values and store the new columns in a new matrix (22l−1
columns have to be stored for each block). Then we have
to consider values xi and xj where i, j belong to two
different blocks. Then one can split each one of the two
blocks in two parts and for i and j spanning such half
blocks one can xor the corresponding coefficient columns
according to the value xixj . We have to store 4(2l − 1)2
new columns for each couple of different blocks.
Then the implementation of QUAD now reduces to
xor one column for each block and 4 columns for each
3. There are no terms with x2i since x
2
i = xi in Z2
5couple of different blocks. The average number of xor
for each bit outputted will now be:
2
(
m+ 4
(
n
2
))
d
For a more detailed description of the procedure see[].
In the numerical implementation we will use n = 160
(the suggested value by Berbain, Gilbert and Patarin)
and beside the classical implementation also the imple-
mentation we just described, taking l = 2 or l = 4. In
order to highlight the trade off between the memory
needed to store the coefficients of the system and the
number of xor/bit required we just have this table
(assuming the word length d = 64):
QUAD implementation Memory xor/bit
Classical 0,4 Mbit 102
l = 2 10 Mbit 56
l = 4 54 Mbit 18
TABLE 1
3.6 A faster variant of RSAPRG and QUAD
In [3] we also described a way to increase the throughput
of a TCSPRBG by replacing the output yn with w(yn)
where w is a suitable one way function that both expands
the number of bits outputted and is fast to compute.
We tested the speed of calculation of a concrete pro-
posal for such function and estimated the throughput
that can be achieved by RSAPRG and QUAD modified
in this way.
4 NUMERICAL IMPLEMENTATIONS
We have exploited the fact that the BigInteger class of
Java language is capable of handling integers that have
a sufficient bitlength to be used in cryptographic appli-
cations. We initially wrote a simple benchmark program
that measures the execution time of M(n). Our program
was compiled and run both on devices with Android o.s.
and on devices with Windows or Mac o.s., namely:
• Mac Pro - Intel core 2 duo P8700 - 2,53 GHz;
• Acer Aspire - Intel Pentium B960 - 2,2 GHz;
• Google Nexus 7 - Nvidia Tegra 3 - 1,2 GHz4.
The plot obtained for these machines is reported in figure
1. When our program was run on devices with Windows
o.s. or Mac o.s., we can observe that the graph of M(n)
is practically quadratic in n (therefore the BigInteger
class seems to use neither Karatsuba algorithm nor
the Tom Cook algorithm). On the Google Nexus 7 the
execution times present a much more singular trend.
There are significant jumps (the execution time doubles)
4. our code, anyway, does not make any use of parallel computa-
tions.
Fig. 1. Comparison of the performance of multiplication
of big integer for an Aspire 2.2GHz, a Mac 2.53GHz and
a Google Nexus 1.2 GHz
corresponding to bitlengths given by powers of 2. There
are also reduced jumps corresponding to 3 · 2k with k
integer. The execution time triples between n and 2n,
therefore the program seems to use Karatsuba algorithm
or Tom Cook algorithm. To support this thesis we found
in internet some modified versions of BigInteger class
that implement Karatsuba algorithm and Toom Cook
algorithm for multiplication. One of these is available
at the website ”futureboy.us/temp/BigInteger.java” and
it has been written by Alan Eliasen .
4.1 Numerical results for RSAPRG
Then we fully developed Java code to implement the
basic iteration for RSAPRG. For benchmark programs of
RSAPRG we fixed n = 6144. Since the BigInteger class of
Java has a different behavior on Windows and Android
devices, we will consider them separately.
4.1.1 RSAPRG - Windows or Mac devices
In this case BigInteger class implements the multiplica-
tion in a classical way then it can be applied one or two
level of Karatsuba algorithm to speed up multiplications
time. In practice it is convenients to apply one level of
Karatsuba algorithm (see table 2)5.
103 Multiplications Mac Pro Aspire
Classical 85 80
Karatsuba 1 level 73 67
Karatsuba 2 levels 73 66
Toom Cook 3 77 66
TABLE 2
Time in ms to compute 103 multiplications (each
multiplicand has bitlength n = 6144).
From table 3 we can see that MR(2n, n) can be more
than twice as fast using method 2 with respect to the
5. Time is averaged on 10 runs with random chosen data. The same
is true until up to table 8.
6calculation of remainder by BigInteger class. Part of
these gain is due to the fact that BigInteger class does
not implement subquadratic algorithms: in this case
assumption (3) modifies in this way:
M(n) '
(n
2
)
' 9M
(n
3
)
Therefore the maximal theoretical gain for method 1 is
5M
(
n
2
)
for method 1 compared to 8M
(
n
2
)
for Barrett,
8M
(
n
3
)
compared to 18M
(
n
3
)
for Barrett. This is consis-
tent with results from table 3.
103 Modular reduction Mac Pro Aspire
Classical 186 182
Barrett (with 1 level Karatsuba) 156 150
First Method 114 107
Second Method 94 84
TABLE 3
Time in ms to compute 103 modular reductions.
In table 4 we report the execution time for the basic
iteration of RSAPRG, like described in section 3.1. Ap-
plying one level of Karatsuba algorithm for multiplica-
tions and implementing modular reductions following
methods described in sections 3.2 and 3.4 yields a time
saving up to more than 40%.
103 x9mod(N) Mac Pro Aspire
Classical 955 953
First Method 688 629
Second Method 602 533
TABLE 4
Time in ms to compute 103 exponentiations (e = 9).
Taking in to account that at each iteration 2196 bit
can be outputted, results from table 4 correspond to a
throughput for RSAPRG of 4,1 Mbit/sec for Aspire and
3,6 Mbit/sec for Mac Book Pro.
4.1.2 RSAPRG - Android devices
The BigInteger class of Java on Android devices im-
plements the multiplication using Karatsuba and Toom
Cook 3 algorithm. Therefore we did not implement any
level of Karatsuba algorithm.
When we apply our methods to speed up modular
reduction (see 5), we observe that results are far from
those expected, in fact times don’t fall below the classical
times.
We think that the reason is that a lot of time is lost
to access memory when we split the operands of same
multiplications in several pieces. For example the time to
compute additions depends very little on the bitlength
of operands (see table 6). The picture changes if we
consider modular reductions MR(2n, n) for larger n.
When n = 24000 or 48000 our methods are effective also
with respect to Barrett algorithm (see table 7).
Remark 4.1: We also optimized code to always mul-
tiplicate operands of the same bitlength, this anyway
makes things even worse for our methods when n =
6144.
Remark 4.2: The gain of second method with respect to
Barrett algorithm in table 7 for n = 49152 is greater than
20%, that is the gain forecast based on section 3.4. This
should be due to the jump effect highlighted in remarks
to figure 1.
103 Modular reductions Google Nexus 7
Classical 546
Barrett 579
First Method 569
Second Method 860
TABLE 5
Time in ms to compute 103 MR(2n, n) (n = 6144) on
Google Nexus 7
Google Nexus 7 50000 Additions
n = 200 688
2000 633
4000 679
6000 770
8000 743
10000 763
TABLE 6
Time in ms to compute 50000 additions with operand of
different bitlength on Google Nexus 7
Mod. reductions n=6144 12288 24576 49152
Classical 520 1755 6528 25342
Barrett 558 1362 3673 10625
First Method 709 1396 3462 9444
Second Method 943 1477 2935 7274
TABLE 7
Time in ms to compute 103 modular reductions with
operand of different bitlength on Google Nexus 7
x9mod(N) n=6000 12288 24576 49152
Classical 2998 9945 34029 131817
Barrett 3126 8072 22779 72533
First Method 3965 8421 21840 68012
Second Method 4975 8629 19946 58948
TABLE 8
Time in ms to compute 103 exponentiations with
operands of different bitlength on Google Nexus 7
The time nedeed for exponentiation is reported in
table 8 and corresponds to a throughput of 0,7 Mbit/sec
for n = 6144 (using classical algorithm).
7QUAD Mac Pro Aspire Google Nexus7
Classical 445 223 4762
l = 2 308 296 3990
l = 4 447 295 2673
TABLE 9
Time in ms to compute 104 basic iterations of QUAD
(n = 160)
Function w Mac Pro Aspire Google Nexus7
104 iterations 302 265 4098
TABLE 10
Time in ms to compute 104 evaluations of function w.
4.2 Numerical results for QUAD
In table 9 we report the time needed to perform 104
basic iterations of QUAD taking n = 160, as suggested
by Berbain, Gilbert and Patarin. The rows with l = 2
and l = 4 correspond to the attempt to speed up the
implementation via some precomputation as described
in section 3.6. We can deduce that for Google 7 we have
some concrete gain, for Mac we have a gain only with
l = 2 while for Aspire we have no gain at all. The
best results of table 9 correspond to a throughput of 7,1
Mbit/sec for Aspire, 5.2 Mbit/sec for Mac and between
0,5 and 0,6 Mbit/sec for Google Nexus 7.
4.3 Numerical results for function w
In the table 10 we report the time needed to perform
104 iterations of a concrete example of function w we
considered in [3]. Such function expands 768 bits to an
output of 4096 bits.
RSAPRG QUAD
1 time 2 times 1 time 2 times
Aspire 19,2 61,6 30,6 79,4
Mac 17,0 54,3 23,0 64,42
Nexus 7 2,8 6,0 2,4 5,6
TABLE 11
Calculated throughput of modified versions of RSAPRG
and QUAD in ms.
In [3] we suggest to apply function w one or two times
to the output of a CSPRBG in order to obtain the final
output. In table 11 we report the calculated throughput
of such modified versions of RSAPRG and QUAD.
5 CONCLUSION
We showed that it is possible to develop implemen-
tations in Java for two well known ”provable secure”
CSPRBG, namely RSAPRG and QUAD. The throughput
rate achieved for RSAPRG seems to be better than the
one estimated by authors in [1], section 5, table 1 (0,67
Mbit/sec on a Pentium 4). The throughput rate achieved
for QUAD is similar to the values decleared in [10].
The maximum speed we achieved is 2453 cycles/byte
on Acer Aspire compared to 2081 cycles/byte achieved
in [11] on AMD opteron 2,2 GHz, L2 cache 1024 kb.
While it is true that we tested our programs on more
recent processors, Java implementations run on a virtual
machine. We also developed several techniques to speed
up such implementations, pointing out some differences
in the behaviour of BigInteger class and in handling
of memory access under different o.s. We eventually
applied a modification of such CSPRBGs we proposed in
[3], showing we can effectively increase the throughput
rate by one order of magnitude. In [3] we extensively
discuss security implications of such modification.
REFERENCES
[1] Ron Steinfield and Josepf Pieprzyk and Huaxiong Wang. On the
Provable Security of an Efficient RSA-Based Pseudorandom, 2006.
[2] C. Berbain, H. Gilbert and J. Patarin. QUAD: A Practical Stream
Cipher with Provable Security. S. Vaudenay(Ed.): EUROCRYPT
2006, LNCS 4004, pp. 109-128,2006.
[3] A. Corbo Esposito, F. Didone. A proposal of a faster variant of
known provably secure PRBGs.
[4] C. Berbain, H. Gilbert and J. Patarin. QUAD: A multivariate stream
cipher with provable security, 2009.
[5] Richard P. Brent and Paul Zimmermann: Modern Computer Arith-
metic, October 2010.
[6] Karatsuba, Anatolii A. and Ofman, Yuri. 1962. Multiplication of
multi-digit numbers on automata (in Russian). Doklady Akad.
Nauk SSSR.
[7] Toom, Andrei L. 1963. The complexity of a scheme of functional
elements realizing the multiplication of integers (in Russian).
[8] D. Coppersmith. Small Solutions to Polynomial Equations, and
Low Exponent RSA Vulnerabilities.J. Cryptology, 10:223-260, 1997.
[9] Magali Bardet. E´tude des systemes alge´briques surde´termine´s.
applications aux codes correcteurs et a´ la cryptographie. PhD,
Universite´ Pris IV, 2004.
[10] Efficient implementation of multivariate quadratic systems, lec-
ture notes in computers science, volume 4356, 2007 page 174-187.
[11] D. J. Bernstein, J. Bunchmann and E. Dahmen (eds). Post quantum
cryptography, Springer 2009.
[12] D. Arditti, C. Berbain. Compact FPGA implementations QUAD,
ASIACCS 2007.
[13] L. Blum, M. Blum and M. Shub. Comparison of two pseudo-
random number generators, Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings
of Crypto 1982.
[14] M. Blum and S. Micali, How to Generate Cryptographically
Strong Sequences of Pseudorandom Bits, SIAM Journal on Com-
puting 13, no. 4 (1984): 850-864.
[15] A. Zanoni and M. Bodrato. A New Algorithm for Long Integer
Cube Computation with Some Insight into Higher Powers .Com-
puter Algebra in Scientific Computing, Lecture Notes in Computer
Science Volume 7442, 2012, pp 34-46.
PLACE
PHOTO
HERE
Antonio Corbo Esposito Biography text here.
8Antonio Corbo Esposito Biography text here.
Antonio Corbo Esposito Biography text here.Biography text here.
